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Book Review
Undressing Difference: The
Hijab in the West
THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL (THE PUBLIC SQUARE) by Joan Wallach
Scott. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007.
208 pp. $24.95 cloth.
Reviewed by Anita L. Allent
In February 2008 French President icolas Sarkozy defended a proposal to
require that every ten-year-old in France learn the intimate biography of one of
11,000 French Jewish children killed in the Holocaust l "[E]very French child
should be entrusted with the memory ofa French child-victim of the Ho!ocaust/'
t Anila L. Allen (aka Allen-Castellitto) is a leading expert on privacy law and contemporary
applied ethics. She is also recognized for scholarship in the areas of legal philosophy,
women's rights, race relations, and law and literature. Allen is the author of numerous
articles and Privacy Law and Society (2007); The New Ethics (2004); Why Privacy Isn't
Everything: Feminist Reflections on personal Accountability (2003); Uneasy Access:
Privacy for Women in a Free Society (1988); and with Milton Regan (eds.), Debating
Democracy's Discontent (1998). Allen's ncwspapcr column, "The Moralist," has appeared in
the New Star Ledger since 2005.
Allen has been a visiting Professor at Harvard, Villanova, Yale, Princeton, and Arizona.
She has been a distinguished visiting faculty at Hofstra. She has been a recipient of
fellowships from Princeton's Program in Law and Public Affairs, the Ford Foundation, the
American Association of University Women, and the American Council of Learned
Societies. Allen serves as a consultant to law finns, businesses, and government. She has
lectured at major colleges and universities across the United States. She is an ethics
commentator for MSNBC and appears on the MSNBC program, "The Ethical Edge." She
has provided news and infonnatioD commentary on MSNBC, PBS, CBS, and CNN. She has
appeared on Good Morning America, 20120, ABC Nighlline, Face the Nation, 60 Minutes,
Burden of Proof, Talk of the Nation, and other nationally broadcast television and radio
programs.
I. Elaine Sciolino, By Making Holocaust Personal To Pupils, Sarkozy Slirs Anger, l . Y. Tu.-tES,
Feb. 16, 2008, at AI ("President icolas Sarkozy dropped an intellectual bombshell this
week. surprising the nation and touching off waves of prottst with his revision of the school
curriculum: beginning next fall, he said, every fifth grader will have to learn the life story of
one of the 11,000 French children killed by the Nazis in the Holocaust. ·Nothing is more
moving, for a child, than the story ofa child his own age, who has the same games, the same
joys and the same hopes as he, but who, in the dawn of the 1940s, had the bad fonune to be
defined as a Jew: Mr. Sarkozy said:').
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the President said.2 According to French Education Minister Xavier Darcos, the
new curriculum would "create an identification between a child of today and one
of the same age who was deported and gassed.,,3 The bold proposal that children
adopt the memory of a victim of the Nazis generated intense concern. Critics
suggested that this unorthodox approach to tcaching history endorsed by
President Sarkozy might even be cruel. And while secularity-lai'cite--is a basic
principle of French governance, critics also attacked the Holocaust Jesson as an
effort to impose a Judeo~Chrislian worldview within the schools.4
This was not the first time a French President drew criticism for embracing
a daring education policy. On March 15,2006, french President Jacques Chirac
signed into law an amendment to his country's education statute, banning in
public schools the wearing of clothing or symbols that "exhibit conspicuously a
religious affi.liation."s Prohibited items included "a large cross, a veil, or
skullcap.,,6 The ban was expressly introduced by lawmakers as an application of
the principle of government neutrality, "du principe de lafcite.',7 Yet opponents
of the law viewed it primarily as an intolerant assault against the hijab, a head
and neck wrap worn by many Muslim women around the world.s
But why would the French government go after the htjab? A national law
dictating that children not attend public school with their hair covered-and in
the land of Liberte, Fraternite, Equalite at that-requires explanation. In Politics
of the Veil, Professor Joan Wallach Scott offers an illuminating account of the
significance of the hijab in France. "What is it about the headscarf," she asks,
"that makes it the focus of controversy, the sign of something intoierablcT9
Prior to the ban, headscarves were barely present in the schools; only a few
Muslim elementary, middle, and high school girls in France wore the hijab. Only
fourteen percent of Muslim women in France said they wore the hijab at all, and
2. Id.
3. !d.
4. Id. ("Mr. Sarkozy wrapped his plan in me cloak of religion, placing blame for the wars and
violence of the last century on an "absence ofGod" and calling me Nazi belief in a hierarchy
of races "radically incompalible with Judeo-Christian mono!heism." Secularists accused Mr.
Sarkozy, who is already under fue for his frequent praise of God and religion, of subverting
both the country's iron-clad separation of church and Slate and the national ideal of a single,
nonreligious identity for all.").
5. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Oflicie1 de la Republique Fram;:aise [J.O.]
[Official Gazene of France}, Mar. 17,2004,5190 (reporting an amendmcnl to the Education
Code and inserting a new article prohibiting "manifestant ostensiblement" articles of
religion).
6. JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, PoLITICS OF THE VEIL (THE PUBLIC SQUARE) I.
7. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Rcpublique Fran~aise {l.0.]
[Official Gazette of France}, Mar. 17, 2004, 5190 ("en application de principe de la"icitc, Ie
pon de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance re1igicuse").
8. Elaine Sciolino, The Reach of War: Religious Symbols; Bon on Head Scarves Tokes l:.1fecl in
a United France, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2004, al A8 ("Although the ban on 'conspicuous'
religious symbols also applies to Jewish skullcaps and large Christian crosses, there was
never any doubt !hat it was primarily aimed at France's five million Muslims and what is
widely perceived as creeping fundamentalism in their midst.").
9. SCOTT, supra note 6, a13.
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a bare fifty-one percent said they actively practice their religion."IO Scott argues
that despite the limited popularity of the Muslim hijab, termed foulard in the
French language, the hljah is a form of "veiling," which has become a
threatening emblem of latc twentieth century anti-Western Islamic politics. Even
a few yards of fabric about the head and neck-leaving the face fully cxposed-
is reviled as a symbol of Muslim women's oppressive femininity and,
inconsistently, their radical insouciance.
Indeed, a woman whose hair and neck are covered by the hijab, like the
woman whose face is covered by the niquab, or whose full body is covered by
the burqa, is a troubling figure for Westerners. She is "veiled," and Scott points
out, some Westerners readily lump together different fonns of Islamic modesty
dress, conceptualizing and problematizing all as "veiling."lI Many Western
observers are uneasy about the veiling embraced or imposed in Islamic countries
and even more so about the practice when it accompanies immigrants to Western
countries, including the United States. The main focus of Scott's book is the
commotion in France over the hijab. Scott joins other U.S. scholars who have
studied "veiling" and the Western discomfort surrounding the practice. Professor
Nancy Hirsclunann, for example, has assessed the nonnative significance of
veiling within Islam and from a liberal feminist perspective, unstymied by
cultural relativism. 12 Scott's lucid, compact examination of the hijab
complements previous feminist scholarship on veiling with a close look at its
role in a particular time and place-contemporary France-where it has been the
subject matter of a unique "political discourse."J3 Professor Seott argues that the
study of political discourse is best undertaken through close readings of
arguments advanced in their specific political and historical contcxts. 14 Studying
political discourse entails examining the language through which cultures create
shared realities and values. Scott's excellent analysis of French political
discourse is valuable for what it teaches readers about the political status of
minority women and religions in France. But, the book also has value as a
cautionary tale for other liberal democracies. Scott persuasively argues that the
French made mistakes other countries will want to avoid.
How different is American political discourse surrounding religious
symbols in the schools as compared to the French? Reserving a full comparative
assessment for others, I will offer a U.S. constitutional perspective on the rights
of religious minorities and women in the public schools, and suggest that a ban
on the hijab must be considered unconstitutional. I believe a proposal for a
national rule against the hijab in public schools or universities would not gain
traction in the United States. In fact. an official ban on the hijab in the U.S. is
10. Id.at3.
11. /d. at 16.
12. NANCY 1. HIRSCHMANN, THE SUBJECT OF LIBERTY: TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
FREEDOM (2002).
13. Scon, supra note 6, at 8.
14. Id.
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virtually unthinkable. The European Court of Human Rights has held that
governments are within their rights when they prohibit head wraps in schools. 15
Even some Muslim leaders believe sovereign nations are entitled to pass laws
baIUling the hijab. 16 Yet if the hijab seems exotic to the French, the French seem
exotic to Americans, who view clothing styles dictated by religion and culture as
private matters largely-though not entirely--outside the realm of legitimate
state intervention. When compared to U.S. approaches to the hijab, the French
experience examined by Joan Wallach Scott underscores an important point:
there is more than onc way to be a modem, multicultural Western liberal
democracy with a Muslim population, and some ways arc better than others.
L UNTHINKABLE IN TH.E UNITED STATES?
In 2005, an eleven-year-old Oklahoma Muslim American named Nashala
Tallah Hearn was suspended from Muscogee School District's Benjamin
Franklin Science Academy. 17 Her sole offense was a refusal to remove her hijab.
Citing a school dress code against wearing hats, bandanas and other head
coverings in the classroom, a teacher had ordered Nashala to lake off her hijab.
When Nashala refused, school administrators punished her for disobedience. ls
Muslim civil rights groups protested the girl's suspension from school. The
United States Justice Department Office of Civil Rights announced that it would
intervene on behalf of a Muslim girl's right to wear the hijab. 19 Feeling the
pressure, the Muscogee School District school board decided to overturn the
suspension. Nashala returned to school victorious, proudly wearing her hijab.
The United States government did not have to involve itselF in Nashala
Hearn's case. But it is nOl surprising that government attorneys would
voluntarily elect to support a pupil's right to wear the hijab. In the United States,
the hijab is commonly worn both by Muslims of recent Foreign extraction, but
also by indigenous black Muslims. Banning Muslim headscarvcs potentially
discriminates against both African-American and non-AFrican-American
Muslims. Although lhe United States Supreme Court has upheld laws aimed at
compelling religious minorities to conform to a variety of majority practices, a
range of federal cases point to recognition of a constitutional right of minority
group members to wear distinctive religiously inspired garb in educational
15. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Em. Ct. H.R. (2005), (Plaintiff, a Turkish
woman, objected to ban on the hijab in Turkish universities).
16. Reuters, Muslim Leader Says Frallce Has Right to Prohibit Head Scarves, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31,2003,atA5.
17. Brian Knowlton, Blish administration intervenes 10 allow Muslim schoolgirl to wear scarf.
U.S. takes opposite tack from France, INT'L HERALD TRIB., April 2, 2004, available at
http://www.ihl.comJarticleS/2004/04/02/islam_cd3_.php. I
18. Id.
19. Cf Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Reshapes Its Civil Rights Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2007, at AI. (Justice Department expanding its traditional civil rights mission to include
protection ofrcligiotls minorities and women imported from abroad to work in brothels).
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settings. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed restrictions on
headscarves. However, especially where the garb in question is called for by a
woman's modesty, it is very likely that the United States would favor
preferences of the individual over those of the state.
A. Embracing Difference
United States federal courts have shown that they are capable of permitting
bans on minority group practices loathed by and threatening to the majority. For
ex.ample, the unrepudiated, late nineteenth century decision, Reynolds v. United
Stales, upheld a law applicable to the U.S. territories, banning the practice of
polygamy among the Mormons. 20 Petitioner Reynolds was a prominent Utah
Mormon who took a second wife with the approval of Mormon officials, nouting
a polygamy ban enacted by Congress. Reynolds wanted to test the legitimacy of
the national ban, and so he cooperated with his own prosecution, eager to appeal
his conviction. Although the First Amendment clearly protects religious
freedom, the Supreme Court held that the right of free exercise is a right to
believe what one wishes, not a right to do what one wishes when what one
wishes to do violates laws of general application. Plural marriages were "odious"
to the civilized West, argued the Court.21 And they were odious in part because
of the shame they brought on women and children of such relationships, who
were stained with an aura of illegitimacy.
The Reynolds Court's interpretation of free exercise played a role in the
Court's decision many years later in Employment Division ofHuman Resources
of Oregon v. Smilh.22 In that case members of a Native American church lost
their social services jobs due to admitted use of sacramental peyote in worship.
They were denied unemployment benefits on the ground that they lost their jobs
"for cause"-using illegal drugs. The Court held that the First Amendment did
not require that the men's use of sacramental peyote be treated any differently
from the use of other illegal drugs. The state interest in protecting the public
from the dangers associated with drug use is a weighty one, reasoned the Court.
Reynolds and Smith evidence a lack of regard for preserving minority
religious differences. But other lines of Supreme Court cases are relevant to the
issue of embracing difference in education, raised by the question of the schoo!
girl's hijab. This other case law reflects a distinct constitutional distaste for
imposing majority practices on well-meaning minority families seeking to
educate their children consistent with their religion.
20. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Laws are made for the government 01
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they rna)
with praetices.").
21. !d. at 164.
22. Employmcnt Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990'
("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs exeuse him from compli:mcc wit!
an otherwise valid Jaw prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate.").
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Nleyer v. Nebraska evidences a strong abhorrence to public laws whose
sole purpose is to ensure assimilation.2J In this case, the Supreme Court stmek
down a state law prohibiting instruction in the Gennan language in a parochial
school.24 The law in question criminalized teaching German to children younger
than thirteen, a crime for which Robert Meyer, a teacher at Zion Parochial
School was prosecuted. The apparent purpose of the ebraska law was
assimilation-to ensure that young children became well-assimilated citizens
who spoke and thought like "Americans." The Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not permit compelling English language instruction.
[The Fourteenth Amendment] denotes nol merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also lhe right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of lhe
common occupations oflife, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.25
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court struck down convictions of
members of the Old Order Amish religion who refused to send their children to
school for formal education beyond the eighth grade.26 A Wisconsin state law
mandated that children attend private or public school until the age of sixteen
years. The court stressed that the application of the compulsory school
attendance law could very well destroy the ability of the Amish to perperuatc
their unique way of life. Only the Amish youth's absence from school was at
issue in the Yoder case, not the "different" clothing they wore to school when
they attended. Yet part of the Amish way of life the Court seemed reluctant to
disnlrb included the Amish style of dress?? The Old Order Amish reject what
they call "English" dress. Instead they wear simple rural attire, not unlike their
nineteenth century ancestors. Deference shown to the Amish way of life and
educational values suggest that other groups' religiously inspired requirements
of their school-aged children would be similarly protected by (he Court. If
government may not constitutionaJly ban instruction in a minority language in a
parochial school or require formal secondary education for members of a
23. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24. Id. at 403 ("Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our
ordinary speeeh, but this cannot be coerced by methods which eonniet with the
Constinnion-a desirable cnd eannot be promoted by prohibiting means.") ("II is well known
that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comcs to one not instructed at an early age, and
experienee shows thaI this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the
ordmary child.").
25. Id. at 399. I
26. Wisconsm v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 206 (1972) (""[Tjhe record in this case abundantly
suppons the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal prcference, but one ofdeep religious conviction, shared by an organized group. and
intimately related to daily living.").
27. Id. at 217.
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minority religious group, it arguably cannot ban the hijab, an article of clothing
worn by a religious minority.
B. Dress Codes
The Supreme Court has not been asked to address the constitutionality of a
hijab ban. However. it has been asked to review decisions that concern the
constitutionality of dress and unifonn codes for school children. public
employees, and members of the anned forces. The Court's dress and uniform
cases afC further evidence of how it might assess the constitutionality of a hijab
ban.
Wearing a Muslim headscarf to school could be compared to wearing a
particular hairstyle and choice of clothing. May public schools demand a
unifonn appearance of their pupils? In the late 19605 and 19705, many public
secondary schools adopted strict hairstyle codes in response to the popularization
of the long styles preferred by entertainers, college students, and "hippies." In
the 1990s there was a resurgence of school uniform requirements in urban public
schools. Uniforms appear to improve school discipline and promote safety.28 On
a number of occasions the federal courts have addressed the question of whether
school children are constitutionally entitled to wear their hair in styles prohibited
by school administrators. Analogous questions have arisen in relation to public
employees' hairstyles.
In Stull v. School Board of Western Beaver, Junior·Senior High School. the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that "the length and style of one's
hair is implicit in the liberty assurance of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.,,29 A school rule prohibited styles in which a boy's hair
covered his ears or fell below his collar line. The court held the policy invalid
and unenforceable, "except as applied to shop classes," where safety was an
apparent issue.
In Kelly v. Johnson, the Supreme Court refused to invalidate hair length
regulations promulgated by a police department.3o Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued for the majority that: "choice of organization, dress, and equipment for
law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption
of legislative validity as are state choices designed to promote other aims within
the cognjzance of the state's police power ....,,31 The requirement that police
officers wear their hair in short styles was a requirement of unifonn and
uniformity. In a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall made the
28. Lisa Rich, Sludents dress up for school: Trenton shows offpotential uniforms for Seplember,
THE TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at A l. ("According to the federal government's 'Manual on
School Uniforms,' a unified wardrobe is one way to reduce discipline problems and increase
school safety:').
29. Stull v. Sch. Bd. ofW. Beaver Junior-Senior High Sch., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d eir. 1972).
30. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
31. /d. at 238.
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case for individuality. Justice Marshall's reasoning was in line with that of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Stull, which struck down a categorical
hairstyle requirement for high scbool boys:
[A]n individual's personal appearance may renect, sustain, and nurture
personality and may well be used as a means of expressing his attitude and
lifestyle. In taking control over a citizen's personal appearance, the
government forces him to sacrifice substantial clements of his integrity and
identity as well. To say that the liberty guaranteed of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not encompass matters of personal appearance would be
fundamentally inconsistent with the values of privacy, self identity, autonomy.
and personal integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution was
d · d 32eslgne to protect.
Kelly v. Johnson is Supreme Court precedent for this principle: courts
should presume the validity ofunifonn grooming requirements that confer public
benefits, notwithstanding any individual's interest in individuality. Following
this principle, one reasonably could conclude public schools constitutionally may
impose uniform dress requirements that impair individuality, as indeed many
public and private schools do. Some schools have uniform requirements that
dictate clothing style and color. Boys are often asked to wear khaki pants and
polo shirts in conservative colors. Girls are sometimes asked [0 wear plaid
"jumpers" or skirts and blouses. Short of a strict uniform requirement, some
schools ban logo shirts, excessively baggy pants, short shorts. tank tops, baseball
caps, and ostentatious jewelry. Certain clothing is prohibited because it can be
used as a place to conceal contraband. Some school districts are persuaded that
school unifonn requirements further the goal of instilling pride and improving
school discipline.JJ
It is one thing to tamp down individuality and something else to interfere
with a person's religion. Schools with uniform requirements could be
constitutionally required to make exceptions to accommodate bona fide religious
difference among their pupils. Some schools explicitly exempt from dress code
requirements the hijab and yarmulke, a Jewish head covering worn by men and
boys. In Shermia Issac's Howard County, Maryland, public school, hats and
other head·coverings were prohibited in the classroom, but an exception was
made for [he yarmulke and hijab.J4 An African-American eighth grader of
Jamaican ancestry, Shermia lost her court battle to wear an ethnically inspired
head dress to school. The girl admitted that the multicolored head wrap her
school forbade was not required by her religion or cultural traditions, and that
32. {d. at 250·51. (Marshall, J., dissenting),
33. Cf Lisa Rich, Outfitting srudenrs for unity. security: Presentation of uniforms set for
tomorrow in city, THE TIMES, Feb. 19,2008, at A3.
34. Isaacs ex reI. Isaacs v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard County, Md., 40 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D. Md.
1999).
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she chose to wear it some days for style to conceal a "bad hair day." However
the wraps were an expression of her ethnic pride, and were of a sort commonly
worn by her mother. Shermia Issac's case suggests that head coverings not
dictated by religion or cultural traditions of modesty need not receive the
deference given a schoolgirl's hijab.
Some schools with dress codes, like the Maryland school cited above, have
concluded that they should or must make exceptions for bona fide religious
attire. As a logical matter, the constitutionality of dress codes and school unifonn
requirements does not entail the constitutionality of banning the hijab or other
religious attire. The case must be made that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments permit a substantial interference with religious liberty. Based on
the precedent of Meyer and Yoder, and the evidence of the Hearn case and public
reaction to it, J believe it is unlikely that a federal court would sustain a school
dress code or unifonn requirement that did not make an exception for pupils'
bonafide religious or cultural modesty garb.
The courts should-and I predict would-distinguish schools from the
military, a limited context where concerns about uniformity have been held to
trump religious expression. The Supreme Court has upheld military policies
limiting the right to wear the yarmulke. In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Court
held that a Jewish rabbi and clinical psychologist, serving as an active duty
member of the military could be prohibited from wearing ayamwlke.35 The case
for pennining the military to ban religious headgear was based on the same
reasoning used to make the case for pennitting municipal police departments to
prohibit long hairstyles-the importance of unifonnity. Unifomls and unifonnity
communicate discipline, professionalism, and submission to a common
authority.
It can be argued that categorical unifonnity in the military-and in law
enforcement-is a legitimate, important, or even compelling state interest. The
case for categorical unifonnity in school is less strong. The needs of schools on
the one hand, and police departments and the military on the other, are
sufficiently different to warrant constitutionally different approaches to religious
or cultural exceptions. A boy in khakis, a polo shirt, and yarmulke, like a girl in a
plaid jumper and hljab, inherently offends no legitimate state interest such as
school discipline or safety. Categorically banning religious or cultural headgear
in schools is incompatible with due respect for the religious and expressive
freedom of children and their families.
35. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Onhodox Jew in Air FOrt:e sued under Firsl
Amendment for right to wear yarmulke).
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C. Modesty
Religious Muslims sometimes say that wearing the hijah is an expression
both of religious identity and of modesty required by religion.36 Thus another
pertinent angle from which to view government imposed restrictions on the hijab
would be U.S. modesty laws. By "modesty laws," I mean the dispersed set of
legal nanns that dictate that adults cover up their bodies for the sake of chastity,
h '\' d \' J7uml Ity, ecency, or mora tty.
One notable manifestation of constitutional respect for women's modesty
is the Supreme Court case, Union Pacific Railroad v. Botsford. 38 This case is a
landmark of the Court by virtue of its immediate recognition of the "right to be
let alone" defended by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis the year before?9 The
case held that a woman who filed a tort action alleging physical injuries need not
submit to a medical exam at the request of the defendant. The woman's modesty
was at stake. The Botsford decision has been effectively overruled by modern
rules; rules of civil procedure now authorize courts to order the examination of
personal injury plaintiffs. But what endures is the sentiment about the
importance of privacy advanced in the BOl!Jford case: "No right is held more
sacred, or more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.',40
The choice of modesty is a prerogative of U.S. women who want it. This is
not to say women have not had to fight for the right to wear Islamic dress to
work. Women wearing the hijab have been denied employment opportunities,
belittled, and harassed.'l1 Still, in the U.S., the salient legal modesty battles of our
time are mainly about women seeking the freedom to dress less modestly than
others expect, and only occasionally about women seeking freedom to be morc
modest than expected. Without success, tavern dancers and owners have gone to
the Supreme Court seeking a right to tOlally nude perfomlances. A battle for
36. See, e.g., I-!IRSCIIMANN, supra note 12, at 175-85 (Professor Hirschmann discusses various
reasons given by Muslim women for wearing a vell and explores ""the veil" as discursive
and social symbolization.").
37. Anita L. Allen, Disrobed: The Con.sli/lltion. ofModesty, 51 VILL. L. REV. 841 (2006).
38. Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
39. Samuel D, Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Righi to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REY. 193
(1890) (arguing for judicial recognition ofa free standing right to privacy). The idea caught
on, and by 1905 the first state supreme court had embraced the right. See Pavesich v, New
England Life Ins. Co. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
40. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251.
41. See, e,g., Campbell v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc" No. 05-74472, 2006 \VL 2865169,
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 2006) (Woman employee of rental car company claims harassment due
to wearing the hijab and praying at work); Wiley v. Pless Sec., Inc., No. 1:105-CY·332-
TWT, 2006 WL £982886, (N.D. Ga. July 12,2006) (Woman employed in secuhty business
claimed job reassignment prompted by her religious use of the hijab violated rules against
discrimination in employment); Alsaras v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., No.00-1990, 2000
WL 1763350, (7th Cir. Nov. 22, 2000) (Woman employee of Dominick's alleged that the
real reason shc was fired was that she wore a hijab and used break time to pray).
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compelled modesty has been symbolically won in the Supreme Court in case~
concerning bans on totally nude dancing. 42 Over First Amendment objections,
the Supreme Court has twice upheld laws that require women to cover up, a
little. The Court has bought the argument that public safety in some communities
hinges on the difference between total nudity and the dorming of "G strings"
covering the genitalia and "pasties" covering the nipples of perfonners. In a
country in which states attempt to impose a symbolic vestige of modesty on its
female citizens to such an absurd degree, it is unlikely that women and girls
exhibiting greater than average modesty would ever be required to remove
modesty garments, solely for the sake ofunifonnity or cultural assimilation.
The Court's refusal to let go of the pastie and G-string reflects a cultural
nudity taboo. Judge Richard Posner has argued that a "nudity taboo" is a feature
of American society that requires deference under the Eighth Amendment even
in the context of prison life, where providing same-sex guards is an
administrative inconvenience and employment rights issue.43 Judge Posner made
the case for respecting "Judea-Christian" modesty values,44 and his argument is
easily extended to Islamic modesty values embraced by many Muslim
Americans. One domain for respecting the Muslim modesty values would be the
context at issue here-prohibiting dress codes that would compel Muslim girls to
remove the hijab.
I am not arguing that there is no context in the U.S. where a woman might
be lawfully asked to remove Muslim modesty dress. 1t seems reasonable to
expect that even a very religious woman can be asked to remove her veil briefly
42. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding constitutionality of city
ordinance prohibiting public nudity); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560 (1991)
(upholding constitutionality of state statute prohibiting public nudity).
43. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, 1., concurring and dissenting)
("The nudity taboo retains great strength in the United States. It should not be confused with
prudery. It is a laboo against being seen in the nude by strangers, not by one's intimates.
Ours is a morally diverse populace and the nudity taboo is not of Wlifonn strength across it.
II is strongest among professing Christians, because of the histOrical antipathy of the Church
to nudity; and as it happens the plaintiff alleges that his right 'to practice Christian modesty
is being violated.' The taboo is particularly strong when the stranger belongs to the opposite
sex. There are radical feminists who regard 'sex' as a social construction and the very
concept of 'the opposite sex,' implying as it does the dichotomization of the 'sexes' (the
'genders,' as we arc being taught to say), as a sign of patriarchy. For these feminists thc
surveillance of naked male prisoners by female guards and naked female prisoners by male
guards are way stations on the road to sexual equality. If prisoners have no rights, the
reconceptualization of the prison as a site of progressive social engineering should give us no
qualms. Animals have no right to wear clothing. Why prisoners, if they arc no bener than
animals? There is no answer, if the premisc is accepled. But it should be rejected, and if it is
rejected, and the duty of a society that would like to think of itself as civilized to treat its
prisonets humanely therefore acknowledged, then ( think that the interest of a prisoner in
being free from unnecessary cross-sex surveillance has priority over the unisex-bathroom
movement and requires us to reverse the judgment of the district court throwing out this
lawsuit. ").
44. Posner's anack against "radical" feminists is potentially misleading. See id. Readers
Wlfamiliar with multiple strands of feminist thought might aSStune all feminists arc
"radicals" intent upon extinguishing all distinctions among the sexes.
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to take a driver's license or passport photograph, or to go through airport
security. At least one court has held that for purposes of being photographed for
a state driver's license photo, a religious Muslim can be required to momentarily
remove her Iliqua~the veil that covers her entire face except her eyes.45
Requiring momentary removal of the Iliquab does not substantially impair
religion and is reasonable. Without a facial photo a driver's license could not
serve as meaningful driver identification.
The events of September II, 2001, unfortunately left many Americans with
a bad taste for Islam and a phobic suspicion of religious Muslims and people
suspected of being from Muslim countries. Even the events of 9/1 1 did not result
in calls for banning the veil, however. Post 9/11 air travel is one of the few
contexts in American life where modesty garments have come into potentially
serious conflict with public purposcs. Screening policies require that all women
be asked to remove head gear, jackets, and shoes when passing through
inspection. Authorities have not sought to deny categorical passage to veiled
Muslim women; though there have been outrageous casualties. One American-
born Muslim woman was strip searched after refusing to remove her hijab in a
public passenger screening area of an airport.46 Authorities have struggled to
devise respectful means of screening veiled women for security purposes, but are
supposed to provide screening by a female professional in a secluded area.
I have ventured the argument that a nalional ban on the II/jab would be
unconstitutional and virtually unthinkable in the United States where religious
expression and voluntary modesty are greatly valued. That the situation IS so
differenl in France, a country that shares our political traditions, is curious. Why
did the French take up arms against the hijab?
n. WHY IN FRANCE?
I.n light of the respect for cullural difference and the promotion of feminine
modesty evinced by U.S. courts, the French hijab ban measure looks
unreasonable and inexplicable. The French ban cannot be well-defended as a
way of limiting the influence of radical Islam or combating terrorism. The
measure only affected girls in French public school who in fact wore the hijab.
The measure did not address the dress of Muslim females outside of schools, nor
prohibit less ostensible Muslim religious symbols in schools. Detennined
terrorists would not push back or be pushed back simply because Muslim school
girls in public schools were not veiled. One of the most useful contributions of
Joan Wallach Scott's incisive book is that it explains why the French banned the
hijab when it seems apparent that doing so would not curtail the influence of
radical Islam or terrorism. Scott helps to makes sense of what otherwise does
not.
45. Freeman v. State, No. 2oo2-CA-2828. 2003 WL 21338619. (Fta. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003).
46. Kaukab v. Harris. No. 02 C 0371. 2003 WL 21823752. (N.D. III. Aug. 6, 2003).
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Scott's book is a proving ground for a method as well as a thesis. Her
central thesis is that outlawing the veil, "even though it was worn by very few
students in French public schools, was an attempt to enact a particular version of
reality, one which insisted on assimilation as the only way for Moslems to
become French.'r17 Scott defends her thesis through an examination of political
discourse which she "undertake[s] through close readings of arguments
advanced in their specific political and historical context.,,48 In defense of her
method Scott persuasively maintains that the "situation of Muslim immigrants in
Western European countries can be grasped fully only if the local context is
k
. ,,49
ta en Into account.
The french hijab ban was a symbolic political discourse of national
identity, Scott explains. The main reason for the French ban was a desire to
signal to French immigrant minorities the felt importance of int.egration and
assimilation. The ban on the veil presupposed that a French identity and loyalty
to the French government required the subordination of religiosity.so To allow
the tiny cross, the tiny star of David, the tiny Koran, but not the Orthodox garb
ofyarmulke andfou1ard,51 was a way of raising flag above faith, says Scott.
To explain the attack on the hijab, Scott systematically considers the roles
of several causative factors. They include: (I) old-fashioned racism and
colonialism towards people of north African and Muslim descent; (2)
secularism-lafcite as a public philosophy in France; (3) individualism as a
public philosophy in France; and (4) residual sex inequality as an embarrassment
to French liberalism.
First, as for racism and colonialism, Scott links the Western obsession with
the veil to sexual fantasies harbored by colonialists who encountered veiled
women abroad: "the veil was a sexual provocation, and a denial of sex, a come-
on and a refusal." 52 A veiled woman might be an unruly prostitute or a slave to a
husband. For the confused colonial, "Islam [was] a cruel and irrational system of
religious and social organization.,,53
Next, according to Scott, "French supporters of the law banning
headscarves defined themselves as apostles of secularism. ,,54 Scott dates
secularism in French schools back to the mid-nineteenth century, when primary
education was made compulsory for boys and girls and when religion was no
longer taught in the classroom by Catholic priests and nuns. Yet while
"militantly secular in theory," she argues "French schools were more flexible" in
47. scon, supra nOle 6, at 7.
48. [d. at 8.
49. [d. at 9.
50. [d. at 10.
5!. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Republiquc Frnnyaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazelle of Francel, Mar. 17,2004, p. 5190.
52. SCOTT, supra notc 6, at 60.
53. Id.
54. !d. at 97.
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allowing dimensions of religion if only in recognition of the historic significance
of Catholicism.55 Some of this flexibility is seen in the way the French
approached the head scarf ban. Scarves were not banned in private schools; they
were not banned for women going about their business in the streets; nor were
they banned for women workers who were employed by the state.56 On the other
hand, the law has sometimes been interpreted as a morc general expression of
official disapproval of veiling, such as the chastising of women who wished to
wear the veil in French naturalization ceremonies.57 Non-Muslims were victims
of the attack on the hijab, which had to be framed in neutral tcnns to facially
comport with liberalism. The education law amendment made an issue of what
had not been much of an issue in France in the past, namely the wearing of
skullcaps by Orthodox Jews and turbans by Sikhs.58 Jews and Sikhs were victims
of a kind of collateral damage in a war whose real enemy was [slamic
difference.59
Scott next argues that individualism was an important dimension of the
political discourse that led to the ban on the headscarf. One might suppose that
individualism would point to freedom of religious choice, as it quite often has in
the U.S. According to Scott, a committee that studied Muslim girls in French
schools concluded that many girls found the hijab oppressive. The fOlilard was
not their individual preference at all. The ban on the scarf was thus presented in
political discourse as a way to liberate and emancipatc individual Muslim girls
constrained by family and cultural pressures to cover·up.
French policy-makers further imagined that the hijab might be a way
Muslim parents dominated their helpless children, recruiting them willy-nilly
into "an international Islamist movement reaching to France from Pakistan, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia.,,60 It is worth asking whether individualism is a public value
that justifies interfering with religious choices made by parents of young
children or teens. Recall that no such rescue of Amish children was endorsed by
the U.S. Supreme Court, though dissenting justices wondered if teenage Amish
children's own desires might be subordinated to, or conflated with, their parents
unfairly.
Finally, Scan explores a political discourse of sexual equality reflected in
the assault on the hijab. She argues that by banning the headscarf, French
legislators believed they were "removing the sign of women's inequality from
thc classroom" and "declaring that the equality of women and men is the first
principle of the Republic." 61 Such declarations are admirable, but the choice of
the hijab is xenophobic, as Scott observes. The fixation on hijab-as opposed to
55. Scan. supra note 6, at 99-100.
56. Id. at 106.
57. {d. at 179.
58. {d. at 107.
59. Id. at 134.
60. {d. at 131.
61. !d. at 168.
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skirts or ponytails-as the symbol of gender inequality can only be explained by
the "foreign" character of this particular feminine emblem. U.S. moms have
sometimes fixated on the Barbie doll or the color pink as the item to purge from
their daughters' lives to insure their equality with boys. BUI the truth of the
mallce is that Muslim girls without hijab, like ribbon-less American girls in
dungarees. arc still subject 10 discriminatory treatment and unequal opportunities
at home, in schools, and in the larger society. It is tempting to think that ifwe are
all to be the same, symbols of difference must be abolished; but another option is
always to spare the symbols and change the underlying reality. For example, in
the 1980s, when women flocked into the legal profession for the first time.
dresses were a symbol of girly vulnerability. We female lawyers on WaH Street
were encouraged to wear severe, man-tailored suits with foulard ties to work.
But eventually firms and clients got used to having competent women around;
women lawyers abandoned the ties and put dresses on the menu of acceptable
office attire. Over time, French students and teachers might have gotten used to
the hijah. The "ijab might eventually have lost some of its power as a symbol of
an unassimilated minority and repressed women.
III. BEYOND TOLERANCE (OR, How TO LIVE TOCETHER
WITHOlJr ATIITUOE)
Immigrant and native diversity are features of Western nations. To deal
with difference, a country may seek to obliterate its symbols. But undressing
Muslim girls from the neck up is a very poor way to create a unified society.
This is Joan Wallach Scott's conclusion, and it is mine as well. We must hope it
is possible for modem liberal democracies to truly incorporate people of various
racial, religious, cultural, and national origins in a single body politic.
Legislating against symbols of difference is not the way to go.
In the final pages of her book, Scott considers competing ideals of nation
sharing. Scott believes political leaders must stop acting as if historically
established communities are essences. She notes that French leaders have treated
French nationality as an essence rather than as a dynamic, fluid construct.62 "In
order to come to terms with its North-African/Muslim population," Scott urges,
"French politicians and intellectuals need to come up with new ways of
addressing difference, ways that acknowledge its existence rather than refusing
to engage.'.6J
h is fonnulating an adequate ideal of nation-sharing that Scott seems to
think is the great obligation of contemporary multicultural democracies. And she
is right. What ideal, though, can a liberal democracy strive for? Is it integration?
Is it tolerance? Could it be multiculturalism? Scott finds fault in some of the
usual ways of naming the inclusive political idea. Integration implies a loss of
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 180.
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identity to assimilation. Toleration sounds snotty; to tolerate is to accept that
which one finds offensive. The multicultural ideal, which has had a significant
life in American political discourse, starting in the 19805, envisions a nation of
people of different sorts, each maintaining loyalty to an identity group, while
mysteriously composing a functioning political unit.
The U.S. is a better place for its acceptance afthe hijab in schools. But the
U.S., like France. struggles with how to incorporate religious and cultural
minorities fully and equally into the life of the society. The United States has had
to Jearn the hard way that racial segregation of African Americans causes
children to grow up feeling inferior to others, and less entitled to public
resources and opportunities. Racial segregation impairs the preparation of youth
for life in a pluralistic, self·goveming society, and interferes with the efficiency,
productivity, and equality of the workplace. But the French surely know this by
now. They have had their own hard lessons, too.
Restless disenfranchised minority youth took to rioting in U.S. cities in the
mid-1960s. A ational Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was convened
by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 to study the causes of rioting in the black
"ghettos." The Kerner Commission, as it came to be called, issued a Report that
interpreted the rioting as African Americans' demand for equality and inclusion.
The U.S. rioters wanted more just police practices, jobs, housing, education,
recreational facilities, political power, fair lending, and respectful racial attitudes.
Something analogous to the U.S. riots happened in France in 2005 and 2006. A
clash with police over the deaths of rwo Muslim teenagers on October 27. 2005,
in Clichy-sous-Bois, a Paris suburb, sparked dozens of racially-charged
rebellions throughout the country, leading to loss of life, property destruction,
injuries, and arrests.64 Lack of opportunity, isolation, and discrimination fueled
the frustration or young people who participated in the rioting. Doubtless,
ghclto-ized French minorities living in the cites fiLM-the public housing
projccts-want thc same things ghetto-ized U.S. blacks have wanted.6s
Disaffected young men waiting to blow are a real, concrete problem for
64. See, e.g., Paul Silverstein & Chantal Tetreault, Algeria-Watcn, Urban Violence in France,
Nov. 2005, http://www.algeria-watcn.orglenlpolicy/urban_violence.htm (last visited March
9,2008) ("On October 27. after playing an informal soccer match with friends at a stadiwn
in Clichy-sous-Bois (a municipality neighboring Saint-Denis). Muhittin Allun, 17, Zyed
BeMa, 17, and Bouna Traore, 15, were heading home to end their Ramadan fast when they
heard police sirens. Bouna told the others to run, claiming tnat members of the Anti-Criminal
Brigade were in pursuit. A security guard from a nearby construction site had called the
police because he believed the teens were trespassing; other young men presenl deny ever
having entered the site. Muhittin, Zyed and Bouna jumped the fence of a nearby electrical
substation to escape the police, but only Muhinin survived. Zyed and Bouna were fatally
electrOCuted. The police have denied seeing the three teens enler the substation. As word
spread about Zyed and Bouna's deaths, young men from the surrounding housing projects
gathered in protest. In a minor set-to with police, they burned 15 cars.' The following
evening, the conflict had expanded, pitting as many as 400 local youth against perhaps 300
riot police and military gendarmes called in to maintain order.").
65. The fiLM (habitation Q foyer modere) is low- and moderate·income public housing in French
cities and suburbs. Many inunigrants from orth Africa live in these facilities.
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French democracy. The school girl's hUah emerged in French political discourse
as a problem too, but one the French could remedy. It was easier by far to muster
political will to "liberate" Muslim school girls than to adequately house, educate,
and employ their brothers. Maybe the frank lesson embracing Jews and the
Holocaust sought by President Sarkozy should be accompanied by a frank lesson
embracing Muslims, the HLM, and the hijab.
